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About 
 
Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 




MACROECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  CAUSES  AND  EFFECTS  OF  REMITTANCES:   
A  PANEL  MODEL  OF  THE   SEE  COUNTRIES  AND  A  CASE  STUDY  OF  SERBIA 
 
 
The main purpose  of this paper is to use econometric modelling in explaining  the 
determinants and main effects of remittances on development and poverty alleviation in the 
Southeast Europe (SEE), and especially to test the impact of European Union enlargement 
policy through migration and remittances. This task is made more difficult by the fact that, 
in case of migration, the SEE is not a clear-cut policy taker. On the one hand, it is difficult 
to distinguish the differentiated policies or regime changes throughout the EU and towards 
different SEE countries in different time periods. On the other hand, even in case of strong 
EU regulations, emigration from different countries is subject to various influences, and 
estimation of real migration and its main factors can be very inaccurate.  
  
Since the data on migration are very scarce and unreliable, our attention will be focused 
on financial remittances, developing a new compiled monthly series of remittances for 
Serbia, as a special case. In order to identify causes and mechanisms of remittances, we 
shall first try to develop a model of remittance determination in the SEE countries. 
These issues will be studied taking into account, beside internal factors, also the 
changes of EU policy regimes in order to analyse how the enlargement policy pursued 
by the EU, as the  developed united economies,  is helping in transformation and 
achievement of sustained growth in the least developed part of the continent.  
 
We are dealing with macroeconomic issues, studying both the main explanatory factors 
of remittances in the recipient countries and the type of dependence on the remittance 
inflows. In some SEE countries remittances are more important than foreign direct 
investment. If the structure of external balance is not changing, there is an incentive to 
export people, or to keep a sufficient stock of people abroad, in order to keep the steady 
inflow of remittances. The supply of migrant labour thus features in some countries as a 
factor of development, poverty reduction and of maintaining the balance of payments. 
The implications of this link for shaping macroeconomic policy  are probably under-
researched as the main focus of the analysis. 
 
In the first part of the paper, some general remarks on migration and remittances will be 
given, as well as the reasons for their increasing importance over time. In the next part, 
panel econometrics will be used to establish whether there is a systematic pattern of 
behaviour concerning the main determinants of remittances in the SEE countries, and to 
test the significance of impacts of the policy regime changes in the EU concerning the 
countries in the region. The third part represents a case study of Serbia, as the country 
with the largest remittance inflows in the region, by means of time series analysis of 
monthly macroeconomic data. The purpose is to discover the main macroeconomic 
causes and effects of remittance growth, both positive and negative, and to establish the 
type of behaviour in which the economy adjusts to the expected remittance inflow, 
distinguishing between short and long-run responses. The fourth part of the paper 
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contains conclusions and policy implications, and the Annex gives the definitions and 
sources of data, as well as a list of relevant references.  
 
Although a number of statistically significant results is presented, the conclusions 
should be taken as preliminary and partial, limited by the quality of data and only 
related to the observed sample in the observed period, so that all statements should be 
considered as an incentive for further investigation in the field. 
 
1.  Migration and Remittances as the World Phenomena 
 
The main reasons for migration are the growing differences of the standards of living 
throughout the world. Therefore, international migration can be considered "a powerful 
symbol of global inequality"
1.  Despite the globalisation  of production and the 
liberalisation of commodity and capital markets, standards of living across the world 
have not been equalised
2 and neither have  the  opportunities for decent work been 
created where people live. This is the key basis of migration. Poverty and inability to 
find a job at home induce people to seek a chance away from their community.  
 
Besides, demographic imbalances between the developed and lower income countries 
are also increasing, which additionally stimulates migrations
3. On the other hand, in the 
globalised world the main controversy is  - open economies but closed societies. 
Although new technologies enable the information to reach the remotest villages and 
although barriers to free movement of people are getting more flexible, social 
integration of immigrants is becoming more and more difficult.  
 
Studying the effects of migration in Europe is becoming especially important in view of 
the EU Enlargement and the transition problems in the SEE countries which cause an 
additional rise in unemployment. Most European countries are experiencing increased 
immigration. The positive effects are that immigrants are contributing to population 
growth, resolving labour shortages and lowering unit labour costs, which all contributes 
to growth and competitiveness enhancement. However, immigrant flows cannot resolve 
imbalances  in the labour market and can even cause certain distortions. In most 
countries labour shortages coexist with unemployment, low participation rate and 
inflows of new immigrants. Quick integration of the newcomers in  the society is 
impossible and it brings about social tensions and different undesirable effects.  
 
It is interesting to note that various cultural and socio-economic barriers also prevent 
intra-European migration. For instance, before the latest EU-15 enlargement, in 1999 
intra-European migration involved less than 1% of the total population of the EU
4. 
Therefore, labour migration can be considered mostly as a phenomenon occurring 
between less d eveloped and developed countries, with a growing importance of 
remittance inflows in the last decade.  
                                                 
1 Black, Natali and Skinner [2005]. 
2 A most relevant framework of the fact that in the era of globalization people have a higher level of 
awareness of their relative standard of living leading to migration can be found in: Milanovic [2005]. 
3 More about this issue in foreword by former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in: Maimbo 
and Ratha [2005]. 
4 According to Katseli [2004].   3 
 
Different positive and negative expectations are emerging with regard to further EU 
expansion to the East.  It can be expected that in the near future there will be an 
increased interest in studying  the  issues of integration of labour markets through 
migration. The problems arising from the free movement of persons are likely to effect 
further negotiations and even bring about some changes in the EU enlargement agenda 
and the current policy regime.  
 
From the viewpoint of the EU countries, it is interesting to note that surveys reveal that 
the majority of EU-15 citizens were fearful of consequences of the free movement of 
persons, even before the latest wave of riots
5 and that the EU Commission produces 
numerous studies reviewing  pro et contra arguments of flexibility of immigration. 
Some of the studies examining similarities in migration across developed (OECD) 
countries conclude that, despite different institutional arrangements, "immigration can 
confer small net gains to the host country" and even produce losses for "those whose 
labour is substitutable with immigrants"
6.  
 
On the other hand, a number of studies investigate impacts of migration and remittances 
in low-income countries, especially in the SEE countries. Most part of the empirical 
evidence shows that the remittance impacts in these countries depend on the effects they 
have on productivity growth and investment. However, the general results support the 
view that remittances have a positive impact on productivity and employment, both 
directly and indirectly through the effects on investment
7. At the macroeconomic level, 
remittances are believed to have predominantly favourable development effects, at least 
by financing education and health expenses
8. But even when they are used for mere 
consumption, remittances generate multiplier effects, especially in poor countries with 
high unemployment. Therefore, "from a development perspective, migration should be 
placed within a context where poverty reduction is a primary and overriding objective"
9. 
 
Thus an especially important effect of migration in developing countries concerns 
poverty alleviation via remittances. In a number of studies a significant relationship 
between international migration - defined as the share of a country's population living 
abroad - and poverty reduction has been established. A study on international migration, 
remittances and poverty, based on 71 developing countries
10, shows that both 
international migration and remittances have a strong, statistically significant impact on 
reducing poverty in the developing countries. The authors have estimated that on 
average a 10 percent increase in per capita official international remittances will lead to 
a 3.5% decline in the share of people living in poverty (counting the poverty line as 
$1.00 per person /  day). This result has been received after instrumenting for the 
endogeneity of international remittances, which actually means that in developing 
                                                 
5 More about that for instance in: De Melo, Miguet and Müller [2002]. 
6 Coppel, Dumont and Visco [2001]. 
7 See: León-Ledesma and Piracha [2004]. 
8 A comprehensive overview of possible positive and negative development effects of migration is given 
in: Farrant, MacDonald  and Sriskandarajah [2006]. 
9 According to Tamas [2006]. 
10 Page and Adams [2005].   4 
countries variations in poverty in turn cause changes both in the number of emigrants 
and in the level of official international remittances they send home. 
 
While migrations are generally happening from lower-income towards more developed 
countries, remittances are regarded as financial flows in the opposite direction. The 
renewed interest in migration and remittances emerged as a result of the growing 
volume of financial remittances to low-income countries
11 and thus emerging questions 
of their potentially proportional contribution to development of these countries. 
 
Although there is a general consensus in the assessment that poor people do benefit 
from international migration, there are many different evidence results that generate 
questions about the conditions of the direct relationship between emigration and poverty 
reduction in the home country. Some studies claim that the poorest people lack the 
means and access to international and long-distance migration. They are instead 
engaged in seasonal and internal migration within poor regions, as a survival and 
income supporting strategy. Therefore, a poverty-oriented migration policy would need 
to focus more on internal and rural-urban than on international migrants
12. Furthermore, 
based on the observation that only the relatively better-off can afford to migrate to 
developed countries, there are case studies (e.g. in Pakistan)
13 indicating that 
remittances can increase inequality. By strengthening the feelings of relative deprivation 
among the poor who are excluded from migration, remittances can potentially lead to 
deeper poverty and inequality in the receiving society. 
 
Remittances make valuable resources to migrants’ families and their countries of origin. 
But the extent to which migration may lead to poverty reduction actually depends on the 
degree to which poor people that remain gain in better opportunities for employment 
and in higher wages
14. A recent thorough literature overview on migration effects
15 
covers cases with gains in wages as a positive effect of emigration, but also the cases of 
labour shortages and other negative labour market effects. The general conclusion is 
that there is a widespread agreement about the significant role of remittances in 
alleviating poverty. However, the  development policies obviously need to take into 
account both the upside and the downside of migration effects on development and 
poverty reduction.  
 
As expected, countries that are located closest to the most developed countries - United 
States or Europe - are also the ones with the highest rates of migration
16. Some authors 
argue that in such countries remittances may reduce recipients’ motivation to work and 
                                                 
11 According to the estimates of the World Bank [2005], developing countries received USD 126 billion 
in official remittances in 2004, while in 1995 total official remittances to developing countries totalled 
only USD 53 billion. These figures, however, do not take into account unrecorded remittance, estimated 
as even higher.  
12 About that see Skeldon [2005]. 
13 Ratha [2003]. 
14 See World Bank [2006]. 
15 A very comprehensive literature overview, with a variety of possible positive and negative effects of 
remittances on development and evidence of case studies in different areas is given in: Lucas [2005]. 
16 Adams and Page [2003].   5 
thus slow down the growth
17. As a form of foreign-currency inflows, a large volume of 
remittances can also  result in currency appreciation, which may affect the 
competitiveness of exports and cause foreign trade deficit problems, as it appears to be 
the case in Serbia.  
 
Beside the complicated two-way links among remittances and development, or poverty, 
which o ften lead to controversial results, a special problem in studying remittance 
effects in developing countries concerns the lack of reliable statistical data. A recent 
study
18 found that the data existing in most countries seriously underestimate the full 
amount of remittance inflows that they receive every year. Coverage of instruments and 
financial institutions through which remittances flow in is limited. Remittances that take 
place through informal channels are measured only in a few countries. Therefore, 
development of cooperation between  the  sending and recipient countries  should be 
established in order to reduce remittance costs, supervise the money transfer and reduce 
money laundering and terrorism financing.  
 
But in view of the very rapid growth of migration and remittances, an important 
question that arises is the issue of how to balance the interests of countries receiving 
new workers and the countries that benefit from their remittances, namely whether 
international migration can become a positive f orce for both  the  receiving and  the 
sending countries. The world experience has shown that forces motivating migration 
cannot be fought by penalties  - they only increase the price of illegal passage. But 
instead of prevention policies, methods should be devised to capitalise on the 
development potential of remittance flows into low income countries, of course 
respecting that remittances are composed of private funds and hard-earned incomes. 
With the intention to maximise the development increase and poverty reduction effects 
of remittance inflows, it is important to develop better  savings and investment 
instruments for remittance recipient households and the migrants' home countries, so 
that a larger part of remittance flows might be channelled to finance acceleration of 
poverty reduction and economic growth.  
 
That is why it is so important to reveal the determinants that stimulate migration and 
remittances. Some of the new results show that remittances, either per capita or in 
percent of GDP, increase with the unemployment rate in the receiving country; on the 
other hand, higher GDP per capita and a higher degree of international integration lead 
to a decrease of remittances
19. However, there is little evidence in the literature about 
the indirect effects of remittances: a reversible flow of funds, namely increase of trade 
between the host country and the country of migrants' origin.   
 
Very often empirical studies investigate how policy changes in the migrants' home 
countries affect migration and remittance flows. But one of the central questions to be 
answered in this study concerns the impacts of changes in the EU migration policy via 
remittance flows on the SEE as lower-income countries. Actually, in order to 
objectively assess the net effects of policy changes in the EU that may affect migration 
and remittance flows into the SEE countries, it is important  that the analysis also 
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includes the internal factors that represent the macroeconomic situation in the recipient 
country of the remittance inflows. The question whether remittances can be regarded as 
a "development tool", despite the private nature of their financial flows
20, can be studied 
by testing double endogeneity of remittance and GDP per capita levels, and by 
establishing whether remittances exhibit a stabilising nature for the recipient economy. 
 
Another important question to tackle is whether there is a significant poverty-reduction 
effect of remittances, and whether there are any negative effects, for instance, through 
deterioration of trade balance, by appreciation of the local currency and stimulation of 
imports. We develop a new and more precise estimate of remittance inflows in Serbia, 
as a special case of highest remittance inflows in the region in answering these 
questions. 
 
Finally, some conclusions and policy implications may be drawn regarding potentially 
more efficient ways of managing remittances. The general conclusion in all relevant 
literature is that, until now, the remittance inflows have not been utilised in the best way 
for expanding development and poverty reduction in lower income countries. Therefore, 
the effective management of migration flows will probably become a top priority for 
policy makers across Europe and in other most developed parts of the world. To begin 
with, t he poverty-reducing impact of international remittances can be increased by 
improvement of the data on migration and remittance flows
21, by lowering transaction 
costs of remitting money to labour exporting countries, and by stimulating formal 
remittance methods
22, so that these funds can be used more productively. 
 
2. Comparative Analysis of the SEE Countries 
 
Remittances are considered to be an important source of external finance and, similar to 
other capital inflows from abroad, a significant source of economic development in the 
home countries
23.  Remittances also represent an important source of reducing poverty 
in developing countries
24. However, the dynamics and importance of remittances are 
different and depend on many internal factors in the home countries of migrants, as well 
as on external factors. In order to increase the benefits of remittances, it is important to 
study their main determinants
25. 
 
In this part of the paper we analyse the main macroeconomic determinants of remittance 
flows in the SEE countries, including the impact of the EU policy changes. Dependence 
of the SEE countries on remittances is associated with specific characteristics of the 
                                                 
20 On the relationship between remittances and development, for instance, in: De Bruyn and Wets [2006]. 
21 Improvement of the existing data on migration, as a priority before they can be incorporated into any 
indicator for monitoring progress towards the existing Millennium Development Goals is stressed in: 
Skeldon, [2005]. 
22 More on suggestions about the poverty reduction effects of remittances in: Page and Adams [2005]. 
23 In theoretical and empirical literature, many papers deal with the development effects of remittances on 
the economy of the home countries, for instance Chami et al. [2003], Leon-Landesma and Piracha [2004], 
McLeod and Molina [2005]. 
24 More on that in: Page and Adams [2005]. 
25 Several empirical studies have in focus macroeconomic determinants of remittances flows, for instance: 
Glytsos [1997], Buch and Kuckulenz  [2004],  Schrooten [2005].   7 
region. On the one hand, some of these countries  had rather developed  economies 
before the Second World War, and although their lagging in development was obvious 
during the period of socialism, they still had high development potentials. On the other 
hand, their geographic position close to EU-15 enabled closer economic relations with 
the most developed countries of the EU. In addition,  the  EU enlargement process 
created good chances to speed up the development of the whole region, so that within a 
decade the new EU members reached high levels of development. However, although 
these countries do not belong to the lowest income countries in the world
26, they all 
experienced migration and most of them are highly dependent on remittances, as usually 
lower income countries are. This again may be partly due to the immediate proximity of 
the EU and more possibilities to migrate in search for jobs and better wages. Therefore, 
the conclusions drawn from the following comparative analysis of the SEE countries 
may not be quite typical for the world migration processes, but should be regarded as 
specific and related only to the observed countries. 
 
In this section we are trying to answer the following questions: 
 
•  What are the main characteristics of t he  remittance  dynamics and  how 
important are remittances in different SEE countries in the observed period? 
What is the type of relation between the level of income and remittances? Are 
larger remittances caused by more intensive sending or  by more intensive 
migrations? 
•  Which are the most important internal determinants of remittances in the SEE 
countries and how the changes in the EU migration policy toward the SEE 
countries (visa regime, work permits) influence remittances?  
 
The methodology of the analysis will depend on the data availability. The remittance 
dynamics will be studied by simple statistical analysis, and the panel modelling will be 
used for determining the main factors of remittances and the impacts of changes of the 
EU policy. In representing the impacts of the EU regime changes, dummy variables for 
each of the characteristic phase will be defined. 
 
Period and data.  Comparative analysis of the SEE countries is based on pooling 
observations of the selected SEE countries over the period 1993-2003. The period is 
chosen to include the years of change in the EU policy regime towards the region and 
runs until the latest a vailable year of the data. The  sample includes West Balkan 
countries with similar visa regimes: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR 
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro; then  the EU candidate countries: Bulgaria and 
Romania; and the countries in the  region with different working restrictions that 
recently joined the EU: Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia; altogether 
121 observations. In order to study the main determinants of remittances
27, including 
internal (macroeconomic indicators in the home country of migrants) and external 
                                                 
26 According to IMF data for 2004, in the total of 180 countries, ranks of observed countries by GDP per 
capita is between places 31 (Slovenia) and 99 & 100 (Albania and Serbia and Montenegro); see World 
Economic Outlook Database, September 2005. 
27  In this analysis w e follow a  broader definition of remittances in the context of IMF balance of 
payments statistics (compensation of employees + worker’s remittances + migrant transfers), since it 
captures the extent of remittances better than data reported as workers’ remittance alone. For details, see: 
Ratha, D. [2005].   8 
factors (covered here by developed countries' policy changes), we have collected a 
number of data, whose detailed definitions and sources are given in the Annex. 
 
Dynamics of remittances in the SEE countries based on the official IMF statistics
28 
show that the magnitude of remittances increases over time in each country. In the 
observed period, both total remittances (with the index 432) and remittances per capita 
(with the index 455) were more than four times higher relative to their initial levels, 
with the average annual growth rate  of  15.8% for total remittances and as much as 
16.5% for their per capita values.  
 
However, along with significant increase of total remittances in the SEE region, they 
considerably differ among the SEE countries. Serbia and Montenegro was the largest 
recipient of remittances, with almost 35% of total remittances received by  all of  the 
observed SEE countries in 2003. If we measure the importance of remittances  for 
domestic economy by their share in GDP or by their per capita value, we can see a clear 
difference between the group of largest remittance beneficiaries (Serbia and 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Croatia) and other SEE countries 
(Chart 2.1). 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Serbia and Montenegro had  an even faster 
growth of remittances per capita than as GDP share. These countries thus attained the 
highest remittances per capita and were the most dependent countries on remittances, 
accounting for more than 10% of GDP in 2003
29. 
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*) Left scale: Remittances per capita in US dollars; Right scale (line): Remittances as a percentage of GDP.  
Source: Balance of Payment Statistical Yearbook, IMF and estimates of IMF staffs. 
 
                                                 
28 Source: Balance of Payment Statistical Yearbook, IMF and estimates of IMF staffs. 
29 On the other hand, remittances are not such a significant source of foreign currency inflow in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. In all these countries the share of 
remittances in GDP is lower than 1%. The exception is Slovenia where the share of remittances in GDP 
was somewhat higher than 1% in some years.   9 
In trying to answer whether the growing remittances per capita in the above mentioned 
SEE countries are a consequence of more intensive migrations from these countries or 
of higher remittances sent by the same (or even lower) number of migrants,  we 
calculated  the total  remittances  per migrant  from the Former Yugoslav Republics 
(FYR)
30 and received a growing  average value of  remittances sent by  each emigrant 
worker. Comparing this measure with total remittances per capita (Chart 2.2), we can 
see that remittances per migrant grew faster than remittances per capita in the period 
1996-2001. As seen from the dynamics of the indices measured on the other scale at 
same chart, one reason for this can well be an even faster growing real GDP per capita 
in the EU - presumably the host countries for most of the migrants from the SEE - and 
consequently higher migrants' wages
31.  Another reason for the faster growth of 
remittances  per migrant  than  per capita is that, along with the increase of total 
remittances (index 131) in the period from 1996 to 2001, there was a faster decrease of 
the number of migrants (for instance, from the FYR the index is 86) than the decrease of 
the number of population (with the index 98). 
 
Chart 2.2 Remittances per capita, remittances per migrant FYR and 





















Left scale: Remittances/pc or  /migration in USD; right scale (line): GDP/pc in EU (indices, 1996=100). 
Source: OECD  Trends in international migrations, 2004 and IMF Balance of Payment Statistical 
Yearbook. 
 
Differences of remittance share in GDP among the SEE countries could be a result of 
both differences in the levels of countries' incomes and remittances. If remittances were 
counted per capita, for all of the observations in the panel - hence for all countries and 
all observed years - we could notice that SEE countries with a lower - or higher - GDP 
                                                 
30 Data are used from OECD Trends in international migrations [2004]. Since there were no separate data 
for each Former Yugoslav Republic in the observed years, we had to use available data on total number of 
OECD immigrants from all Former Yugoslav Republics. 
31  The income of host countries could also influence the changes in remittances dynamics. Some 
estimations show that there is a positive, but not significant impact of the GDP of host countries on 
remittances per capita. See: Global Economic Prospect, World Bank [2006].   10 
per capita get relatively more remittances than the middle-income countries within our 
sample
32. An exception from this are data for Croatia which show a relatively high level 
of remittances per capita  during the whole period of observation, although  Croatia 
belongs to a group of middle-income countries in the region
33. 
 
The existence of an almost U-shaped curve between the level of remittances per capita 
and GDP per capita could be noticed from the Chart 2.3a. This relation  can also be 
proved by a simple correlation analysis (i.e. by different signs of correlation coefficients 
for the two subgroups of observations, below and above the average): remittances per 
capita and GDP per capita are negatively correlated for the below-average income per 
capita observations (r = – 0.2), whereas the correlation for countries and observations 
above the sample average is positive (r = 0.4). 
 
However, this pattern of relation is somewhat different if we express remittances as a 
share of GDP against the GDP pc (Chart 2.3b). In lower income countries remittances 
make a  larger  GDP share,  which means  these countries are more dependent on 
remittances  than middle- and high-income countries in the sample
34. Correlation 
between the share of remittances in GDP and GDP per capita is significant and negative 
(r = – 0.584) for observations with lower than the sample average GDP pc, and is not 
significant (r = – 0.01) for the observations with the income per capita higher than the 
sample average. The reason is that relatively faster GDP per capita growth lowers the 
share of remittances in GDP, so that the high per capita growth of remittances does not 
appear to be a significant GDP share for high-income countries. 
 
Chart 2.3 Remittances per capita and remittances share in GDP  
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Determinants of remittances. Actually, different dynamics of remittance inflows could 
be caused by internal (the home country’s economic factors) as well as external (the 
                                                 
32 Contrary to this result, some studies show that developing countries with low and high GDP per capita 
produce smaller share of migrants than middle-income developing countries - thus following an inverse 
U-shaped curve; on this see: Page and Adams [2005]. 
33 The exception of Croatia is probably due to the specific observed period (war period) and thus a 
growing number of emigrants from Croatia. In order to test whether the same type of relationship between 
remittances pc and GDP pc exists without the Former Yugoslav Republics, we eliminated the data for 
Former Yu-Republics from the sample and the U-shaped relationship was again confirmed. 
34 A similar conclusion can be found in Lucas [2005].   11 
host country’s) factors. In the literature on remittances, many  factors were found 
significant in determining migrant decision to send remittances: economic situation of 
the household and the country of origin, the level of skills and earnings of the migrants, 
the costs of migration, the duration of the stay related to the type of migration 
(temporary or permanent migration), the stage of development and labour market 
conditions both in home and host country, etc.
35  
 
While a variety of empirical studies deal with remittances using microeconomic level of 
data, there are also papers which analyse macroeconomic variables as determinants of 
remittance inflows
36 in both host and home countries (unemployment rate, rate of 
inflation, money supply, consumer price index, exchange rate). The results often show 
that the host country economic conditions are more important for remittance inflows 
than economic factors of the home country. Other studies point out that the motive of 
migrants to remit depends on type of migration, so that remittances sent by temporary 
migrants are not significantly determined by the home country’s condition, but rather by 
the host country’s income level
37. A study  using data for Egypt
38 showed that both 
exchange rate and interest rate differentials were important macroeconomic 
determinants of migrants' remittance flows through official channels. Another empirical 
analysis of the 24 transition countries
39 shows that both remittances per capita and their 
share in GDP significantly depend on the following internal factors: home country’s 
income level, labour market situation, the lack of domestic credits, performance of the 
domestic banking sector, the openness of the economy. 
 
In choosing the relevant macroeconomic determinants of remittances in the SEE 
countries, we follow the common result of most of the above mentioned studies i.e. that 
shocks to employment, output and wages in the home country may give an incentive for 
sending more remittances. More precisely, we consider the following factors as possible 
internal determinants of remittances for the SEE countries: domestic income level, 
domestic labour market situation (in view of unemployment and the level of earnings, i. 
e.  the average wage level), domestic credits to private sector, and openness of the 
economy. In addition, we are using the change in the EU policy as an external factor 
representing the impact of the developed countries, which was never covered in the 
previous empirical studies.  
 
The income level in the SEE countries is captured by variable GDP per capita in current 
USD, the labour market situation is measured by the unemployment rate, and the 
average wages are given in current USD. The variable of domestic credits to private 
sector is given as a percentage of GDP, and the openness of the economy is measured 
by the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP (all in USD).
 More details about 
the data and their sources are given in the Annex. 
                                                 
35 More about that can be found for instance in: Schrooten [2005]. 
36  Vargas-Silva and Huang [2005], Schrooten [2005], Buch and Kuckulenz [2004], El-Sakka and 
McNabb [1999] etc. 
37 In other words, there is a distinction between remittances sent by temporary migrants who plan to 
return to their home country and remittances sent by permanent migrants who plan to stay in the host 
country permanently (see for instance: Glystos [1997] or Buch and Kuckulenz [2004]). 
38 El-Sakka and McNabb [1999]. 
39 Schrooten M. [2005]   12 
 
On the basis of the findings in the literature on remittances, the higher unemployment or 
lower wages in the home country  can be expected to  increase  the  incentives for 
migration, which may consequently cause the remittance growth. Lower domestic 
credits to private sector might have a positive impact on remittance dynamics, since 
remittances are considered an alternative in case of a lack of domestic credits in the 
developing countries. Opposite to that, an increasing degree of openness of the home 
economy indicating l arger integration into the international markets of goods and 
services is considered to be a potential factor of decline of remittances. Therefore, a 
positive sign of regression coefficient of the variable unemployment rate is expected, 
while negative signs are expected for the wage level, domestic credits and openness of 
the economy in the model of remittance determinants
40.  
 
The statistical analysis at the beginning of this section of the paper gives an indication 
that importance of remittances in the SEE countries is indeed related to the income level 
as an internal factor. Remittances could be procyclical, indicated by positive correlation, 
countercyclical (negative) or even acyclical  - no correlation with the GDP in the home 
countries
41. Procyclical variations of remittances go in line with business cycles, 
implicating their spending is mostly investment-oriented. Countercyclical variations of 
remittances, contrary to this, can implicate that they are mostly used to smoothen 
consumption, to additionally  increase the income of migrants' families in periods of 
crises. They also imply that along with the increase of welfare in the home country, 
migrant families become less dependent on remittances. 
 
In assessing the impacts of the developed EU (host) countries on the lower-income SEE 
(migrants' home countries), the EU policy changes should be represented as a relevant 
external factor. Changes in policy, consisting of various different measures, thus not 
measurable and best explained descriptively, are usually denoted by dummy variables in 
econometric models. In deciding how to represent the changes in the EU migration 
policy towards different SEE countries, it is important to note that t he migration 
regimes are an important part of the EU enlargement process. Therefore, the phases in 
the process of negotiations and the corresponding changes in the EU policy towards the 
SEE countries (relaxation of the EU migration policy) could be considered as relevant 
external factors that influence remittances
42. 
 
The EU policy changes are represented by dummy variables, signifying  the specific 
type of status in the EU enlargement process of every country in each particular year: 
 
•  Dummy variable D0 indicates the EU policy towards potential SEE candidates, 
as the first phase of a more beneficial treatment in migration policy;  
                                                 
40 This is for example shown in Schrooten [2005], both for the model of remittances per capita and their 
% share in GDP.  
41 More on this issue can be found for instance in Sayan [2006]. However, in regression models based on 
panel data,  consisted of both time series and cross-section data, either positive or negative relation 
between GDP and remittances does not necessarily mean that remittances are countercyclical or 
procyclical with respect to business cycles. 
42  For example, the number of employment permits issued to Turkish immigrants has significantly 
increased from 1998, after the implementation of the association agreement with the EU. See: OECD 
[2004], Trends in International Migration 2003, OECD Annual Report.   13 
•  D1 captures the changes in the EU policy toward those SEE countries that have 
signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (the Europe Agreement), as 
the next phase in the enlargement process. This variable takes value 1 for the 
period from the Agreement ratification until the formal beginning of the 
accession negotiations and value 0 otherwise; 
•  D2 covers the next phase of the country status in the enlargement process - the 
period of formal beginning of the accession negotiations. 
 
The following table gives the scheme of dummy variable treatment in the panel, where 
each dummy signifies periods where it takes the value 1, at other periods taking value 0. 
 
Table 2.1 Unit values for dummy variables representing a country's status 
in the EU enlargement process 
 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Albania                D0  D0  D0  D0 
Croatia                D0  D1  D1  D1 
B&H                D0  D0  D0  D0 
S&M                D0  D0  D0  D0 
Macedonia                D0  D1  D1  D1 
Bulgaria      D1  D1  D1  D1  D1  D2  D2  D2  D2 
Romania      D1  D1  D1  D1  D1  D2  D2  D2  D2 
Slovenia        D1  D1  D2  D2  D2  D2  D2  D2 
Hungary    D1  D1  D1  D1  D2  D2  D2  D2  D2  D2 
Czech R.        D1  D1  D2  D2  D2  D2  D2  D2 
Slovak R.      D1  D1  D1  D1  D1  D2  D2  D2  D2 
 
 
We estimated the following panel data model of remittances per capita
43: 
 
it Wage it Open it Domcred it GDPpc it Unemp it R 5 4 3 2 1 b b b b b a + + + + + =
  it v it D it D it D + + + + 2 2 1 1 0 0 g g g          i=1,..., N; t=1,...T                  (2.1) 
where the dependent variable is: remittances per capita of country i in the year t (Rit); 
internal factors of country i and period t are: unemployment rate (Unemp it), GDP per 
capita (GDPpcit), the share of domestic credits to private sector in GDP (Domcredit), 
openness of the economy (Openit), average wages (Wageit); external factors a re 
captured by dummy variables (D0it, D1it and D2it). 
 
                                                 
43  We used  the standard  panel data techniques  to estimate the relationship between  chosen 
macroeconomic variables and remittances per capita (Pooled Least Squares Method-POLS, covariance 
method, Random Effects Generalized Least Squares Method). Estimation and hypothesis testing with 
panel data have been done using STATA/SE, Version 8 (2003).   14 
According to the first results, we could conclude that the labour market situation in the 
SEE countries had a significant impact on the remittance inflows in the observed period. 
This is shown by the fact that the higher level of remittances per capita coincides with 
higher unemployment. The sign of estimated coefficient of wages in domestic 
economies is unexpectedly positive
44, but not significant. Along with the higher level of 
openness of the economy and domestic credits to private sector, we could expect the 
lower dependence on remittances. However, in case of the SEE countries, these two 
variables, although with the expected signs of their coefficients, showed no significant 
influences on remittances per capita and that is why they were dropped from the model 
in the next step of estimation.  
 
GDP per capita variable also appears to be insignificant determinant for the whole 
sample. The insignificance of the GDPpc coefficient in the initially estimated equation 
can be possibly due to the observed non-linear relationship with remittances per capita. 
In order to test this U-shaped relation, we defined three GDP per capita variables: the 
first, for the lower-than-average income data (SEE countries); the second, for the 
higher-than-average income data; and the third for Croatia, to capture the observed 
outliers in the panel sample. Only the first and the third GDP variables appeared to be 
significant, the first one with a negative coefficient sign.  
 
The results of the estimated model of remittance determinants are presented in the Table 




Table 2.2 Estimated model of remittance determinants in the SEE  
- Dependent variable: Remittances per capita 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Significance level 
Unemp  0.496  0.000 
GDPpc-Low  -0.173  0.000 
GDPpc-Croatia  0.049  0.055 
D0  1.849  0.000 
D1  -1.440  0.000 
D2   -0.772  0.000 
Constant  3.081  0.000 
R
2 =0.640; Breusch-Pagan test=8.241 (0.004);Wald statistics (7) = 364.27 (0.000); 
Total number of observations=121 
 
The results again point out that the unemployment rate is a significant explanatory 
variable of remittances per capita, but domestic credits to private sector, openness of 
                                                 
44 Positive sign could indicate some pro-cyclical variations of remittances: in periods of growing average 
wages, remittances a lso increase to support some migrant's family long-run expenditures; but higher 
wages can be just a consequence of an increase in unemployment. 
45 The first test results show that we should not ignore the presence of heteroscedasticity (F test, Breusch-
Pagan, Honda test for individual effects). The same problem exists even after logarithmic transformation of the 
series, so that we used the feasible GLS as an appropriate method for the model (2.1).   15 
the economy and average wages are insignificant determinants of remittance inflows to 
the SEE countries. In addition, there is a different response of remittances to the unit 
change of GDP per capita in low- and middle-income countries (Croatia). 
 
Significant negative impact of GDP per capita on remittance dynamics in lower-income 
SEE countries could indicate that remittances are more important and more intensive 
during down cycles of the economic activity in those recipient countries. On the other 
hand, as the country's income increases, the living standard of migrant families becomes 
less dependent on remittance inflows
46. The opposite is true for Croatia, as the middle-
income country, where remittances per capita grow with the GDP pc, thus possibly 
indicating their different use. For the  higher-income SEE countries we also found  a 
positive but insignificant impact of their GDP per capita on remittance inflows. 
 
As  certain studies showed that macroeconomic activity in the home country had an 
impact on remittances, and the opposite was found in some other studies, we could 
expect the endogeneity problem between the remittances and the home country GDP. In 
that case biased coefficient estimates would not allow impartial significance testing. 
That is why we also tested for simultaneity between remittances per capita and GDP 
per capita (all three variables) using Hausman test for simultaneity. However, the test 
result indicates that there is no endogeneity problem of any of the used versions of the 
GDP  per capita variable. Therefore, a two-stage  estimation procedure was not 
necessary. 
 
But most important for this analysis, and apart from the significance of the internal 
factors
47, is the finding that different EU policies toward the SEE countries appear to be 
a relevant determinant of the remittance per capita level. The positive and significant 
regression parameter of the first dummy variable D0 shows that for potential candidate 
countries remittances per capita are significantly  higher than is the overall average of 
all SEE countries in the observed period. However, the significantly negative regression 
coefficient of D1 indicates that SEE countries receive lower remittances per capita and 
thus seem to  be less dependent on  migration after having signed the Association 
Agreement. Dummy variable D2, capturing the phase starting with the formal beginning 
of the accession negotiations, also has a significantly negative effect on remittance 
flows, showing that the next advanced stage in the EU enlargement process further 
reduces remittances per capita. 
 
In other words, remittances are more intensive in low-income SEE countries, although 
decreasing with the GDP per capita rise, and are higher in countries that have not yet 
signed the Association Agreement, but they become reduced by each more favourable 
stage of the country in the EU enlargement process. These results give an indication 
that, in general, the changes in the EU policies  do  have distinctive effects to 
migration/remittance practice of the SEE countries and have considerable impacts on 




                                                 
46 More about evidence of that kind in: Buch and Kuckulenz [2004]. 
47 It should be noted here that in the presence of GDP as a regressor, coefficients of dummy variables 
represent additional (individual) impacts of the status in the EU enlargement, above the GDP influence.    16 
3. Analysis of Determinants and Importance of Remittances in Serbia 
 
Serbia has the highest remittance inflows in the observed sample of the SEE countries. 
The World Bank report
48 positions Serbia among the top 11 countries in the world by 
the value of remittances in 2004, highest of all SEE countries, and at the even higher 
(eighth) place in relation to the remittance share in GDP - 17.2%. The reason for this 
may be in the fact that there were quite a few large waves of emigration in Serbia in the 
last several decades.  The former Yugoslavia had a long tradition of economic 
emigration and was the first communist country to allow free travelling abroad in search 
for employment in the early 1970s. The migration trends became even stronger in the 
latest period, after the disintegration of the country in 1991.  Some investigations 
estimate as  many as 4 million emigrants from Serbia – comparing with the current 
population of only 7.5 million
49.  
 
Due to economic and even more non-economic factors, wars and political conflicts in 
the region, mostly young population emigrated, drastically changing the demographic 
situation in the country. The only positive effects are significant remittances, which 
became the largest source of foreign currency inflow and a usual reliance of every 
government. After a decade of economic collapsing under Milosevic's regime, the 
country largely depends on capital inflows that can facilitate achieving sustainable 
growth and transformation into an open market economy. Rapid economic 
reconstruction since 2000 caused a swiftly growing trade deficit. The export/import 
ratio fell from 78% in 1994 to only 34% in 2004. Therefore, beside the privatisation 
revenues, foreign direct investment, grants and foreign loans, remittances make an 
important and probably the most substantial source of increased foreign financial 
inflows.  However, the question remains whether remittances can neutralise negative 
results of high emigration, as well as whether their effects can be made more useful and 
act as a positive force in the development of the economy. 
 
In this section of the paper we intend to establish the main macroeconomic factors in 
Serbia that influence remittance inflows and to examine the relative importance of 
remittances in Serbia a s a source of development increase, poverty  alleviation and 
neutralising large deficits. The results of this analysis, together with the inference of the 
comparative study of the SEE countries, should help us define the conclusions that 
could indicate the main policy implications regarding the optimal use of remittances.  
 
The main questions to be answered using macroeconomic data are: 
•  What are the main macroeconomic factors that influence such high remittance 
inflows in Serbia? 
•  To what extent can the large remittance inflows be connected with the 
development increase and poverty reduction in Serbia? 
•  To what degree does the country rely on financial results of exporting labour 
as a secure source of foreign currency funding?  
                                                 
48 World Bank [2006], p. 90. 
49 Only Serbia is analysed here, without the Kosovo Province, the UN Protectorate since 1999. About 
problems of migration from Serbia, see for instance: Grecic [2003].   17 
•  What are the possible negative consequences of the macroeconomic 
adjustment to high remittances?  
 
Data and the observed period. The period of observation should start with 2001, since 
both economic structure and methodology of data classification changed significantly 
after the democratic changes of October 2000. We shall try to use monthly series for the 
relevant macroeconomic data whenever possible, in order to model remittance dynamics 
and macroeconomic behaviour in expectations of remittances, distinguishing between 
the short- and long-run effects. Thus the  main  econometric analysis is based on time 
series, for the period December 2000
50 until February 2006 (63 months). All the 
relevant time series (remittances, output level, unemployment rate, average dollar wage, 
trade deficit, imports, consumer goods imports, etc.) show distinctive linear trends. By 
unit root test they have all been found to be trend-stationary in the observed period. 
 
Official statistics usually have problems in proper evidence of remittances, a large part 
whereof is coming through informal channels. That is why a new compilation of the 
monthly series is made here, based on net monthly inflow to foreign currency accounts 
and also to exchange offices, after subtracting the estimated income from tourism
51. The 
new estimate of remittances more than doubles official figures in the last six years, but 
it  is still lower than the IMF estimate (Table 3.1), which indicates that there is no 
overestimation of the current inflow. 
 
Table 3.1       Estimates of remittances per annum (in million US $) 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Official National Bank statistics  512  405  520  779  988  1182 
New estimate used in this analysis  348  1029  1329  1788  2291  2306 
The IMF estimate  1132  1698  2089  2661  3509  – 
 
Determinants of remittances. Since there were no changes in the general status of the 
country regarding the EU policy regimes in the observed period, all other previously 
used variables have been considered as possible determinants of remittances, namely 
macroeconomic data as internal, and trade balance figures as external factors. 
 
Remittance inflows exhibit certain cyclical variations around a linear trend
52. Their 
variations around the time trend (stationary residuals of remittances) with the stationary 
monthly indices of the industrial production (output), taken as a proxy for the economic 
activity, show a low negative correlation (-0.27) and similarly with the wage variations 
around the trend ( -0.21)
53. This points  at a somewhat countercyclical nature of 
remittances in Serbia, meaning that in periods (months) of relatively lower economic 
                                                 
50 The observed period starts with January 2001, but the data should also allow for the time lag. 
51 Since the national currency (dinar) is the only official means of financial transactions in the country, all 
foreign currency inflows that finance current spendings have to be exchanged into dinars.  
52 These cyclical variations might also be considered as seasonal, since the data are monthly. 
53 The correlation is negative and somewhat higher with output level lagged one month; for the series of 
average wage in dollars the variations are computed around the fitted parabolic trend.   18 
activity and personal incomes, remittances are relatively higher. This is an indication 
that remittances are supporting consumption to a larger extent than investment.  
 
Evidence of  countercyclicality of r emittances for different countries
54 shows that 
remittances are  driven by  complex dynamics and respond differently to the state of 
economic activity in the home countries of migrant workers. That is why the individual 
country characteristics should be carefully studied prior to designing policies related to 
remittance flows. 
 
Among all available macroeconomic series in Serbia, remittances show the highest 
correlation with the series of imports, especially imports of consumer goods. Average 
wage in dollars, unemployment rate, domestic credits, trade deficit and total imports 
were all eliminated from the model of remittance determination by criteria of statistical 
insignificance, in the general to specific modelling procedure. Only the consumer goods 
imports and the output level with the one-month time lag turned out to be significant, 
followed by the lagged value of remittances. Therefore the estimated model of 
remittances in Serbia for the observed period of 62 months shows an autoregressive 
nature (a positively rising trend) with a positive regression coefficient of consumer 
goods imports and a negative regression coefficient of the lagged industrial output 
(Table 3.2). The model of remittance determinants is thus also supporting the previous 
conclusion that remittances are mostly oriented towards consumption. 
 
Table 3.2 The estimated model of remittance inflow as a dependent variable 
55 
 
Variable  Coefficient  T-ratio  Significance level 
Remittances (t-1)  0.422578  3.940848  0.0002 
Cons. goods imports  0.499891  4.117992  0.0001 
Industry output (t-1)  -2.162264  -3.402872  0.0012 
Constant  10.25248  3.722019  0.0004 
R
2 =0.488;    DW=1.677;    JB=44.163;    DF=-7.454;   BG(4)=1. 986;    W=5.864 
 
 
Poverty reduction. The 2003 World Bank report on poverty assessment finds that one 
out of ten  persons in both Serbia and Montenegro is affected by absolute material 
poverty, which indicates the lack of consumption of essential food and non-food goods 
and  services. In addition, about one third of the population can be considered a s 
"vulnerable to poverty or poor"
56. From the point of view of the historical standards, this 
can be considered a very high incidence. This situation is partially due to the great 
impoverishment during the country's economic isolation, but also to a tremendous 
increase in unemployment (up to 30% in 2005 according to the National Employment 
                                                 
54 About the countercyclical nature of remittances, see for instance: Sayan [2006]. 
55 Variables are measured in natural logarithms. The results of statistical tests and the analysis of residuals 
statistics (Durbin-Watson, Jarque-Bera, Dickey-Fuller, Breusch-Godfrey and White's LMF) all indicate a 
considerably satisfactory model specification, despite a relatively low coefficient of determination.  
56 While absolute material poverty is defined as full consumption below the cost of the poverty line 
(poverty threshold is set to 2.4 $ per day for Serbia in the Report), vulnerability line is set at the level 50 
percent above the poverty line. See: World Bank [2003].   19 
Service), caused by privatisation of the state sector, economic restructuring and 
dismissal of the redundant labour. That is why it can be expected that most of the 
remittance inflows are used to compensate for the low incomes or the lack of any means 
of support. 
 
Analysis of poverty in Serbia is very difficult due to scarce and unreliable data. 
Comparing average monthly per capita expenditures in US dollars on food and clothing 
in the last couple of years, as a relative measure of poverty, according to the Serbian 
Statistical Survey, they are negatively correlated with remittances. This can be an 
indication that remittances are more intensively coming to the country at times 
(quarters) of lower per capita consumption, or higher relative poverty (Chart 3.1). This 
is yet another indication that remittances are mostly used for consumption, i.e. for 
poverty reduction. 
 


















Remittances and expenditures on food and clothing (pc)
 
*  Left scale: Quarterly remittances  per capita  in US $.  Right scale: Monthly average 
expenditures per capita in US $ for food and non-alcoholic beverages, clothing and footwear; 
counted from household survey, by use of household average number (source: Statistical Office 
of the Republic of Serbia). 
 
Trying further to investigate the role of remittances in development increase and 
poverty reduction in Serbia on the macroeconomic level, in absence of more reliable 
data on poverty, we counted per capita GDP
57 in US $, and compared with the annual 
inflows of remittances (Chart 3.2). In the observed five years, both remittances (with the 
increase index of 224) and per capita GDP (with the index 241) more than doubled their 
initial levels, following the same pattern of growth: in the first couple of years the 
growth rate was above 30%, and in the following years reduced to half (14.5%). 
 
Therefore it seems that the estimated level of remittances, as a substantial part of GDP 
(about 10 stable percents of GDP) represents an important source of reducing low-
income problems in the years of economic restructuring and growing unemployment in 
                                                 
57 Annual data of GDP estimates used from the Central Bank, using current market prices and the current 
exchange rate of dollar, and divided by population to receive per capita figures.   20 
Serbia. By substantial increase in annual financial inflow, remittances undoubtedly 
represent an important factor of improving the standard of living in the country. 
 
















GDP per capita and estimated remittances 
 
* Left scale: GDP per capita in US $. Right scale: New estimation of remittances in million of US $ 
 
However, some estimates show that, from 10% population below the poverty line in 
2002, poverty has been increasing in the past years (to 13% in 2004), and so has Gini 
coefficient
58 indicating higher inequality in distribution and concentration of wealth.  
This shows that although remittances are indisputably raising the general income level 
in the country, they are still not distributed in the way that would considerably reduce 
poverty problems, since the most jeopardized groups of the society obviously have no 
household members sent abroad to help them financially. 
  
External balance results. Exporting labour in return for remittances seems to be an 
accepted strategy to rely on in achieving external balance in Serbia. Remittances show a 
rapidly growing trend, as fast as the  trends of imports or trade deficit, keeping a 
constant ratio of 22% with imports, and 45% of the trade deficit. The estimated 
remittance inflow in Serbia exceeded the amount of foreign direct investment and in the 
last five years (2001-2005) made on the average 9.6% of the total GDP.  
 
High correlation of remittance inflows can be noticed with the trade deficit (r=0.614), 
thus indicating that remittances are a substantial source of external finance in Serbia. 
The degree of lowering trade deficit by remittances is made obvious by comparing their 
values in Chart 3.3. 
 
It is worth noting that in the  past five years (2001-2005) remittances somewhat 
exceeded the consumer goods imports, and only in 2004 their ratio amounted to less 
than 100% (94%). However, imports of raw materials and energents are much larger, so 
that consumer goods imports make only about 20% of total imports. High remittance 
                                                 
58 Gini coefficient measures the empirical distribution (Lorentz curve) relative to the line of perfect 
equality. It ranges between zero for perfect equality and one for perfect inequality (total concentration). 
The measurement of poverty was done by the World Bank team [2003] and Gini coefficient by the 
UNICEF - Innocenti Research Centre [2005]; source: Ekonomist, Special Edition, 2004.   21 
inflow encourages trade deficit increase, so that the deficit is growing fast (from 19.4% 
of GDP in 2001 to 28.8% in 2004, and only owing to a higher rise of exports in 2005 it 
fell to 22.5% of GDP).   
 
Examining the structure of remittances, it can be noticed that it is highly correlated with 
the structure of imports from the EU: for the 12 largest exporters, from which the sum 
of imports into Serbia makes 57.10% of total imports, the sum of remittances (by  the 
new methodology) makes 52.56% of total remittances, and the correlation coefficient is 
positive and equals 0.507. However, when Russia is excluded from the sample (because 
of large imports of petroleum, and relatively much lower remittances due to the liberal 
visa regime), the correlation coefficient increases to 0.684, and without Italy (as another 
extreme of high imports but a low number of immigrants from Serbia), the correlation 
coefficient between the imports and remittance origin for the remaining 10 countries 
increases to 0.923. This shows that the structure of consumer imports highly matches 
the structure of remittances. 
 















Macroeconomic consequences.  In order  to study t he cause-effect pattern of 
relationship between the remittance inflows and consumer goods imports, as the 
macroeconomic indicator that exhibits highest correlation with remittances (r=0.76), 
and to distinguish between long and short-run effects (multipliers), we use a  vector 
autoregression model (VAR)
59. As the first step, all series were expressed in terms of 
logarithms, so that the coefficients of the linear model can be interpreted as elasticities 
and heteroscedasticity is reduced. 
 
Since the test results show that the relevant macroeconomic series are trend-stationary 
with a structural break, to reduce them to stationarity we have eliminated linear trends 
from the series and the structural breaks by appropriate dummy variables. The consumer 
goods imports had a shift of linear trend since January 2005, due to the introduction of 
the Value Added Tax, and the estimated remittances had an outlier in December 2005, 
due to high expectations of devaluation of the  national currency
60. As an exogenous 
                                                 
59 The model was estimated by EViews 5.0.  
60 These speculations were caused by a scandal after the arrest of the Central Bank's Vice-governor.   22 
factor, monthly index of the industrial output level (a stationary variable) was also 
included to represent fluctuations of the economy.  
 
By using VAR lag selection criteria, eight lags were included in  the model and the 
stability test shows that the VAR is stationary, since all roots lie inside the unit circle. 
By the Granger causality test, examining significance of blocks of other endogenous 
variable's lags in each of the equations,  it  was established that remittances cause 
consumer goods imports, while the opposite is not true. Therefore, remittances can be 
treated as an exogenous variable in this relationship. In demonstrating short- and long-
run effects through the dynamic (lag) structure of the VAR, the impulse response 
function traces cyclical but diminishing long-run multipliers through time, as a sign of a 
stable VAR model. The highest response to the same variable's shock is after one month 
and to the other variable's shock after a year.   
 
The variance decomposition chart gives percentages of the forecast variance due to each 
innovation. Since remittances do not significantly respond to consumer goods imports, 
the variance decomposition of forecast error of remittances shows that after a year the 
percentage of its forecast error attributable to shocks in the other variable stabilises at 
the percentage of only 6%. On the other hand, variance decomposition shows that an 
increased percentage of the variations in consumer goods imports can be attributed to 
innovations in remittances and that this percentage rises from 8% after one period to 
40% after another 12 months. 
 
The estimated VAR model proves that there  is a very strong adjustment process of 
consumer goods imports to the remittance inflow. By eliminating all lags except the 
dependent variable's one, the estimated model of consumer goods imports
61 (Table 3.3) 
can be interpreted as a habit formation model: the past level of consumer goods imports 
has a significantly positive coefficient, and the long-run elasticity to remittances is 
exceeding by far the short-run elasticity. Moreover, it appears that the imports of the 
country adapt to the expectation of remittances, while remittances are driven by 
decelerated economic activity and previous habits formed by imported consumer goods. 
This behaviour bears its share in the trade deficit. The IMF delegation has recently 
stressed the problem of high trade deficit as the primary economic problem in Serbia
62. 
 
Table 3.3   The model of consumer goods imports as the dependent variable  
Variable  Coefficient  T-ratio  Significance level 
Cons. goods imports (t-1)   0.845593  19.48185  0.0000 
Remittances  0.087437  2.345997  0.0225 
Industry output   0.839557  3.621288  0.0006 
Dummy Jan. 2005  -0.969549  -6.150446  0.0000 
Constant  -3.472813  -3.476296  0.0010 
R
2 =0.922;   DW=2.004;   JB=13.944;    DF=-7.892;   BG=0.861;   W=1.405 
Short run elasticity: 0.0874; long run elasticity: 0.087/(1-0.845)=0.563 
 
                                                 
61 All variables (save dummies) are measured as natural logarithms, thus coefficients are elasticities. 
62http://www.24x7.co.yu/default.aspx?cid=700&fid=300&pid=promocija_liberalnog_pristupa_trzistu   23 
In the analysis of macroeconomic effect of remittances to the exchange rate, the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) should  also  be counted and compared with the 
remittance dynamics. We first obtained the nominal exchange rate of dinar, as a 
weighted average index of its values in dollar and euro, with weights equal to the 
estimated shares of dollar (30%) and euro (70%) transactions in the Serbian foreign 
trade. The relative price index was received as a ratio of indices of consumer prices in 
Serbia and a similarly received index of weighted average of the US and  the EU 
consumer price indices
63. Multiplying the nominal exchange rate with the relative price 
index in Serbia, an estimate of the real effective exchange rate is received, as a measure 
of change of the relative value of dinar to foreign currencies through time. Chart 3.4 
shows that the appreciation of dinar is closely related to the level of remittances in the 
observed period, with a positive correlation coefficient of 0.553.  
 







































Remittances (mil.$) and the real effective exchange rate (Dec.2000=100)
 
* Left scale: Remittances in million of US $. Right scale: Indices of the real effective exchange rate of 
dinar (December 2000 =100) 
 
However, appreciation of the domestic currency is expected to negatively influence the 
remittance level and vice versa. The positive exchange rate shock
64 that faces a 
migrant's household would mean an increase in value of remittances and the migrant's 
savings counted in domestic currency, thus leading to an increase in their incomes and 
an incentive to use the favourable o pportunity. The monthly changes of REER in 
Serbia, as short-term exchange rate shocks, indeed demonstrate a significant negative 
correlation with the monthly level of remittances (r=-0.515). But the  established 
                                                 
63 Definitions of the used variables are given in the Annex. 
64  On the effects of exchange rate shocks to households’ investment, see: Yang [2004].  By using 
household survey data in Philippine on 1,600 households with overseas members, the author estimates 
that a 25 percent improvement in the exchange rate faced by a household with overseas migrants led 
remittances to rise six percent as a share of household income and, in addition, it also raised the 
Philippine-peso value of migrants' overseas savings. Thus remittances accounted for a substantial portion 
of the households' total income prior to the crisis, for 40 percent on average, which led to their increased 
long-term investment.   24 
positive correlation of their levels in the long-run can only mean that large remittances 
have some effect on the domestic currency appreciation.   
The increase of the real exchange rate of dinar in the observed period has been made 
possible only by a rapid inflow of financial means from abroad, and our analysis shows 
that the estimated remittances are the largest source of this foreign inflow. The 
consequence of this is underestimation of foreign currencies, making imports relatively 
cheaper and domestic production less competitive, thus resulting in growing imports 
and decreasing exports, namely in a rapidly increasing trade deficit. In addition, habit 
formation in imports of consumer goods shows a firm orientation towards preference of 
foreign goods in consumption, thus indicating larger external balance problems than the 
great remittance inflows can solve. 
 
Until 2006, Serbia remained the last of the newly independent former Yugoslav 
republics
65 with no apparent status in the EU enlargement process. This is a result of 
various political circumstances that also influenced high migration and consequently 
largest remittance inflows in the region. Remittances showed an undoubtedly income-
increasing effect in Serbia, with their newly estimated figure reaching as much as 10% 
of GDP, although there is no evidence of their direct poverty-reduction results. A 
mixture of their positive and negative effects can only lead to a conclusion that 
exporting labour to benefit  from remittance inflows in return is by no means the best 




In the macroeconomic sense financial remittances are a summation of numerous 
individual inflows from various foreign countries to different types of recipients and 
motivated by a variety of incentives. Therefore all general conclusions derived from the 
undertaken macroeconomic analyses should still be treated as limited, related to the 
particular region at a particular period, and subject to the quality of the used data. But as 
much as such analyses make it difficult to generalise the results, the high aggregation of 
remittance inflows also enables assessment of their dynamics compared with other 
macroeconomic indicators and an evaluation of the overall impact of remittances as an 
outcome of developed countries' policies on the low-income countries.  
 
In the comparative analysis of the SEE countries, we have shown that differences in 
relative remittance levels among those countries are, in fact, the result of differences in 
the levels of countries’ incomes, indicating that SEE countries with lower and higher 
GDP per capita get more remittances per capita than the middle-income SEE countries. 
 
In addition,  the  growing dynamics of remittances per migrant,  faster than their per 
capita values in the West Balkans, could point to a growing importance of remittances. 
The reasons that enabled this are faster growing real GDP per capita values, and 
consequently higher migrants' incomes in the EU host countries, but also a faster 
decrease of the number of migrants than population in the migrants' home countries. 
 
The comparative analysis of determinants of remittance inflows to the SEE countries 
has shown that the most important internal determinant of remittances in the SEE 
                                                 
65 Bosnia-Herzegovina is an exception, due to the UN protectorate.   25 
countries is domestic labour market situation. Namely, the increase of remittances goes 
in line with the growing problems at the domestic labour market, especially 
unemployment level. This leads to the conclusion that more jobs in the SEE countries 
would cause the significance of remittances, and therefore migration pressures, to 
decline.  
 
For the low-income recipient SEE countries, another important internal factor which 
determines the remittance inflows is their GDP  per capita. R emittances are more 
intensive during the down-cycles of the economic activity in the  low-income SEE 
countries behaving countercyclically. This implies their relative increase in periods of 
crises and their use mostly  for consumption. In higher-than-average-income SEE 
countries, living standard of migrant families does not seem to be decisive in remittance 
inflows; hence we expected that the growth of the home country economy may attract 
more remittances for investment purpose. This is partially confirmed by a positive 
coefficient of GDP pc for Croatia, as a middle-income country, but in higher-income 
SEE countries the impact of GDP  per capita level on remittance inflows, although 
positive, is not significant. 
 
Regarding the impact of the EU migration policy changes toward the SEE countries on 
remittances, it has been established that remittances are m ore intensive in potential EU 
candidates than in the countries for which there is somewhat relaxed EU entry policy. In 
other words, significant changes in relative remittance decrease happen along with the 
upgrading of the country's status in the EU association process. This may well be a 
consequence of an improvement of the country's welfare, but since the effect of GDP 
per capita was already counted for, it can also mean that the formal change in the EU 
policy has significant psychological effects reducing migrations, and consequently 
remittances. With a better status in relation to the EU and therefore a stronger economic 
basis of an SEE country, there would be less reason for significant increase of migration 
and remittances. Therefore it seems that, as a response to migration pressures on the EU 
labour market, a more flexible but organised scheme of the EU enlargement would 
lower migration incentives more than the firm EU visa regimes. 
 
The case study of Serbia demonstrates that, like in most transition economies where 
unemployment increase inevitably follows  the  economic restructuring,  the  labour 
exporting and relying on the resulting remittances also became a traditional 
development strategy. Due to even stronger motivations to emigrate, as a consequence 
of war in the region and economic isolation of the country, a large percentage of Serbian 
population left the country and consequently r emittances represent an important 
increment to total income (GDP) of Serbia.  
 
Judging by the established reducing effect on migration and remittances of the 
increasingly beneficial status in the EU enlargement process for the observed sample of 
the SEE countries, Serbia can be regarded as an extreme case, both in its detrimental 
position caused by the postponed SAA and as the largest remittance-recipient. 
 
In Serbia remittances show slightly countercyclical (seasonal) variations, i.e. negative 
but low correlation with the lagged industrial output and wage fluctuations, and high 
correlation only with the external balance figures. The mechanism of remittance inflow 
and spending seems to be the following: a larger part of remittances comes into the 
country outside of banking channels; foreign currency inflows are exchanged into dinars   26 
and spent mostly for consumption, since they are highly correlated with the imports of 
consumer goods. As a part of consumption, they seem to be helping in the country's 
poverty reduction. However, the growing percentage of population below the poverty 
line shows that remittances are not distributed among the neediest groups of population.  
 
Besides, remittances are not oriented towards development financing and their effects 
seem to be evident only in the short run. Therefore, more significant results in their 
spending for stimulating growth and consequently poverty reduction could be achieved 
through a more organised management.   
 
Large and growing foreign trade deficit is obviously financed partly by substantial 
remittance inflows. In that respect, at the first sight remittances seem to show a positive 
effect in pursuing external balance. However, a rapidly growing trade deficit is 
obviously financed by a high foreign currency inflow, which produces the established 
national currency appreciation, as a negative effect of large remittances that lead to 
reduction of the domestic production competitiveness. 
  
A great dependence of imports on remittances and the established type of causality 
exhibit a form of habit formation behaviour in Serbia. But the similar dynamics and 
corresponding structure of consumer goods imports show that a large part of financial 
remittance inflow sent by Serbian emigrants seems to be returning to the migrants' host 
countries, as repayments of the recipients for the imported products. 
 
Certain policy implications can be drawn summing up the results of this research and 
the conclusions of the relevant literature. As a compensation for exporting labour, 
remittances represent an implicit trade-off with the outflow of manpower from their 
home countries. Remittances are currently the second most important source of 
development finance to developing countries at  the  global level after foreign direct 
investment
66. The growing volume of financial remittances impose the questions about 
balancing interests of the  host and home countries of migrants, which requires 
systematic and thorough investigation of determinants and effects of remittances in each 
specific case.   
 
From the point of view of the migrant-host countries, beside the positive effect of 
importing labour, usually highly-skilled, remittances indirectly reduce the requirement 
for their official development assistance to low-income countries. Also, the increased 
income levels in home countries of migrants can contribute to widening of the existing 
and development of the new markets for the more developed countries. 
 
On the other hand, for home countries of migrants, remittances represent a stable source 
of foreign exchange, significantly supporting consumption level and possibly having a 
considerable poverty-reducing effect. They c ould also contribute to  the  increased 
investment, usually in basic infrastructure and in funding community-oriented 
investment projects, if successfully managed.  
 
However, there are possible negative effects which should be avoided. The most 
frequent n egative effects for both home and host countries of migrants are sudden 
shocks and deviations at the labour markets. In the home countries of migrants, another 
                                                 
66 More about that in: Solimano [2004].   27 
negative effect  that can appear  is  the syndrome of high recipients' dependence on 
remittances which  can dissimulate incentive to work and even increase inequality
67. 
Besides, raising the exchange rate due to high foreign currency inflows can make the 
manufacturing sector less competitive and thus negatively influence growth and 
development in the remittance-recipient country.   
 
All the evidence indicates that financial remittances are currently not being used in the 
most optimal way
68. Although at the macroeconomic level remittances consist of a large 
number of separate private funds with different origin and purpose, there are policy 
measures that could  increase the potential development impact of remittances and 
indirectly help in poverty  alleviation
69.  These policies seem to require certain 
innovations in managing emigration,  for instance in  organising  institutions or social 
networks
70, both for facilitating migration and reducing black economy activites, and 
for influencing the income earned by migrants to help reduce poverty and inequality. 
 
Besides, it is important to increase competition in order to reduce costs in the remittance 
market
71. This can be achieved by increasing the facilities in the financial systems in 
both host and home countries for better use of remittances in development projects. 
Attracting remittance inflows by specific accounts for education, housing or business 
projects can encourage their more productive use. But above all, the improvement of 
business environment in home countries that would encourage the return of emigrants 
with their fresh capital, international contacts, new technology and know-how can thrust 
development and economic growth in the low-income countries.   
 
The return of skilled labour to low-income SEE countries would also mean a much 
faster development of modern social system and public institutions, as necessary 
conditions for rapid transition, since "productive individuals who are capable of being 
successful in high quality institutional environments have the strongest interest in seeing 
that these institutions are built"
72. Thus the return of migrants seems to be a more 
promising strategy than the use of their remittances hitherto. Also, a more favourable 
status of an SEE country in the EU enlargement process has shown to be supportive in 
replacing migration and remittances by income increase in the home country. 
 
                                                 
67 Evidence on that can be found in: Skeldon [2005] and Ratha [2003]. 
68 This is also confirmed for Serbia by the preliminary results of the ongoing research on remittances from 
Switzerland "Migration remittances and Development Financing: Action Research / Case Study Balkans 
and Switzerland", conducted by IOM, Geneva. 
69 For an outline of remittances-related policy measures in making remittances more efficient for 
development and poverty reduction, see for instance: Tamas [2006] pp. 24-32, Farrant et al. [2006], De 
Luna Martínez, J. [2005], and Carling [2004]. 
70 The examples of why access to social capital or social networks is critically important for successful 
migration and remittance use can be found in: Black, Natali and Skinner [2005]. 
71 A recent survey of central banks in 40 developing countries across different regions in the world (De 
Luna Martinez [2005]) shows that most countries need to establish better mechanisms in order to 
maximize the developmental effect of remittance inflows; besides, cooperation between sending and 
recipient countries is needed to reduce remittance costs. 
72 More about benefits from the return of migrants in: Kapur and McHale [2005].   28 
ANNEX  
 
1. Definitions and sources of data in the SEE countries 
 
Average wage in current US dollars:  WIIW Handbook of Statistics  ‘Countries in 
Transition 2004‘. 
Domestic credits to private sectors, as a percentage of GDP: Transition Reports 2000 
and 2004, EBRD. 
Dummy variables for the EU policy change towards the SEE countries: 
D0 – the first phase of the process in the EU accession; it takes value 1 for the 
period since 2000 to indicate the status  “potential candidate countries”  for Albania, 
B&H, Croatia, Macedonia and S&M. 
D1  – takes value 1  for the period from  signing  the SAA until the accession 
negotiations start;  Hungary 1994-1997, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania 1995-1999, 
Czech Republic and Slovenia 1996-1997; Macedonia and Croatia from 2001 on. 
D2 – takes value 1 for the period since the formal beginning of the accession 
negotiations; Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia from 1998 on, Slovakia, Bulgaria 
and Romania from 2000 on. 
Sources of information on country status in the EU enlargement process, websites:   
•  http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ 
•  http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/index.htm  
•  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/ 
•  http://www.eurasylum.org/ 
•  http://www.icmpd.org/  
GDP per capita,  in current US dollars:  WIIW Handbook of Statistics ‘Countries in 
Transition 2004‘, and IMF database (www.imf.org).  
Number of migrants, for calculating remittances per migrant: Trends in International 
Migrations, OECD, 2004. 
Openness of the economy, the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP in current 
US dollars: WIIW and Transition Reports 2000 and 2004, EBRD. 
Population, for calculating per capita figures: WIIW Handbook of Statistics ‘Countries 
in Transition 2004‘. 
Total remittances in US dollars, as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of 
employees and migrant transfers: The Balance of Payment Statistical Yearbook 2004, 
IMF. For the missing data  (B&H and Macedonia in the first years) estimates were 
received by  interpolation, taking into account the share of remittances in GDP. For 
Serbia and Montenegro the data are based on estimates of the IMF (IMF publications 
''Serbia and Montenegro: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix'', 2001, 2005). 
Unemployment rate - official: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 
(WIIW)  Handbook of Statistics ‘Countries in Transition 2004‘, and Transition Reports 
2000 and 2004, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
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2. Data sources and methodology for Serbia
* 
 
BOP data,  monthly data  (exports, imports, imports of consumer goods, inflow of 
remittances to forex accounts, outflow from forex accounts, net foreign exchange 
purchases) in millions USD: National Bank of Serbia (NBS).  
Consumption per capita in USD, quarterly data = average expenditures per capita for 
food and  non-alcoholic beverages,  for clothing and footwear,  in CSD/quarterly 
(CSD/USD) exchange rate:  Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS) 
Dollar wage, average wage, end of month, in USD = wage (average wage, end of 
month) in CSD/average monthly (CSD/USD) exchange rate, SORS.  
Exchange rate, average monthly (CSD/USD): National Bank of Serbia  
GDP, annual data, market prices, constant 2002 prices, in millions of dinars (annually): 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia  – Communication number 74/06 (code 
NR40);  GDP per capita = GDP/Population; GDP pc in USD =  GDP per capita in 
CSD/average (CSD/USD) exchange rate; 
Gini coefficient, several annual data: UNICEF - Innocenti Research Centre; “Economic 
development – where to go further?”, Ekonomist magazin, special edition, 2004. 
Human poverty index (HPI), in % , several annual data:  First series (2002-2004): 
Serbian Government, Poverty Reduction Strategy website (http://t7.sw4i.com) and 
2000-2003: “Economic development  – where to  go further?”, Ekonomist magazin, 
special edition, 2004. 
Output level, approximated by the i ndustrial p roduction  index, monthly, average 
2005=100;  calculation of q uarterly and annual indices is based on monthly data: 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia  
Population, annual data (at the mid-year): Statistical Yearbook of Serbia 2005, SORS 
Communication number 306/05 (code SN40), estimation for 2005 = population at the 
middle of 2004  +  average of natural increase + net internal migrations estimation. 
Average of natural increase: Monthly Statistical Review number 2/2006; Net internal 
migrations estimation = average net internal migrations: Statistical Yearbook of Serbia  
Real effective exchange rate (REER) index, monthly = NEER index * RPI index in 
Serbia / (0.3*USA CPI index + 0.7*EU HICP index
73).  NEER = Nominal effective 
exchange rate index, monthly series = 0.3* (Nominal USD/CSD exchange rate index) + 
0.7*  (Nominal EUR/CSD exchange rate index). Nominal USD/CSD exchange rate, 
nominal EUR/CSD exchange rate index: Calculation based on nominal daily exchange 
rates: NBS website. 
Real  USD/CSD exchange rate  index, monthly average = (Nominal USD/CSD 
exchange rate index) *  RPI index  in Serbia / USA CPI index. Nominal USD/CSD 
exchange rate index: Calculation based on nominal daily exchange rates: NBS website. 
                                                 
* The official data and new estimates of remittance inflows for Serbia were provided by 
Mr Milan Aleksic from the National Bank of Serbia (NBS). 
73 NOTE: Weights of 0,3 for US dollar and 0,7 for euro are NBS staff estimation, based on shares of trade 
of Serbia with USA and EU respectively. Until January 2001, ponders were 0,35 (USA) and 0,65 (EU). 
Source: NBS.   30 
RPI index in Serbia: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia  – Communications 
(code CN10), monthly publication. USA CPI index (monthly series): NBS. 
Real wage, (monthly indices) = Nominal gross average wage month-to-month index/ 
retail price index (RPI): Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia  
Remittances,  monthly data:  estimation of total remittances inflow  = inflow of 
remittances to forex accounts (remittances through the banking system)  +  inflow of 
remittances through other channels  (net foreign exchange purchases  –  estimation of 
foreign exchange purchases from tourism) + outflow from forex accounts). Estimation 
of foreign purchases through tourism is based on average yearly foreign tourist 
expenditures per day (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia) and estimation of 
average yearly foreign exchange purchases from tourism in 2004 (NBS staff 
estimation).  
Trade deficit, monthly data = exports – imports, in USD: NBS 
Unemployment, employment (monthly, in thousands, end of period): NBS.  
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